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scientific criteria 1r the
time
death and accept<• ·e format: for dealing with [ ctors,
donl'• s, and rec ipients m transplantations.
T he major concern o f Medico/
Moral Commitees is moral itytruth-protectio n of innocent lifeconcern for society's most he lpless
beings- the unborn , the deformed
-the aged. Legal questions need
to be faced , but legality sho uld
not dictate morality. It is our position-not without competent legal
backing- that the more firmly our
Catholic position and integrity a re
reaffirmed, the stro nger o ur case
in court. In recent personnal corre·
spondence with Andre Hellegers ,
he felt that Medico/ Moral Commit·
tees can help resolve tough cases
within the directives but not with·
in the civil legal system. "U ltimately you would be asked how you
picked the jury."
Age of Ecumenism
Our ·hospitals have been first in
establishing departments of pastoral care to bring in- as official, part·
time chaplains - ministers and rabbis of the community to minister
to their own parishioners. The
Catholic hospital respects the conscience of every one.
Plurali.s m is a two-way street. As
others who disagree with us go their
way freely, we expect and demand
the right to go ours.
So frequently , Pluralism is spok·
en to imply that we sho uld abandon
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our positions and join those
whom we are in fundamental
agreement.
This is not logical. This is
Democratic. However, let it
be said of us that we dq not re~
the conscience of othe rs. ·w t
That is why we promo te De
ments of Pastoral Care and (
interfaith programs. We re·
the inviolability of the c onsc
o f others. We demand the
freedo m for o ur consc ie nce.
Every hospital has a consctt
A hospital· is not simply p(
cement and automated equipr
The conscience resides in the
soring group and Board of I
tors. As they are legally respor
fo r the quality of care and thL
tection of standards in the ho'
we believe that they a re lik
responsible for the ethics and
tone of the services provided

llh

is101

BOOK REVIEW

....

!Ol

x t

lo.
trt·
1er
ect
1ce
me
ce.
red
·nt.
on·

·ec·
tble
>rottal,
vise
1ral

Conclusion
Yes, we .a re ·in a battle, rr rs a
new ball game, but we are in here
fighting, confident and ho .eful.
We are restricted in many \\ ysbut especially by o ur own ca u ous·
ness and fear of taking hard !. tnds.
If the Catholic Hospital va 1 tshes
from the American scene because
of total secularization, it '"' II be
an irreparable loss. Despite the·
doom sayers from within and with·
out the Church, we are indeed
Catholic and society needs Catholic hospitals. We will not a ba ndon
the challenge!
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Death By Choice

:

by Daniel C. Maguire
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Reviewed by William E. May
At the o utset it is necessary to
say that several featu res o f this
work disturb me greatly. and I hope
to show why in -some detail later.
Despite these troubling qualities,
and they are critically significant ,
the work and the argume nt that it
advances merit wide readership and
thoughtful respo nse , partic ularly
by physicians, nurses, priests and
others charged with caring for the
dying; to its author we owe gratitude for exploring so se nsitively a
question of tremendous urgency.
The central question Maquire
raises is this: "can it be moral and
should it be legal to take direct
action to terminate life in certain
circumstances?" His answer is · yes,
and the major part of the wo rk is
devoted to showing why he believes
that this is m orally right, altho ugh
he is also concerned to have this
moral right legaiJy recognized.
Before tackling the moral issue,
h~wever, Maguire first shows why
thiS question is o f such urgency .
tOday. We live in a world where the
tremendous advances in medical
SCience have made it very difficult
to die, in a world where it makes
sense to ask whether the medical
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"treatment" being give n so me patients is really helping to preserve
the ir lives or whether it is simply
pro lo ng ing their death. At present
people c an be kept alive inde finitely in a comatose state, a nd there
have been instances whe n a utopsies
perfo rmed on in dividual s maintained in existence for years have
sho wn that their brains had already
liquefied. We live, too, in a world
where the law has failed to keep
pace with medical realities and
where juries at times have had to
find persons innocent of " murderous" crimes by reason of insanity
whe n these persons were neithe r
insane no r morally guilty of mu rder
-and juries have had to do this to
"get around the law." Finally, we ·
live in a world where the moral
certitudes of another day have been'
questioned, and seriously so, by
thinki ng persons, including Catholic moral theologians and even one
bishop, Bishop Simons of India. All
this Maquire relates, and brilliant·
ly, in the first part of the book.
In the second part of his study
Maquire first provides a methodology for "doing" ethics. He is concerned principally with discovering
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the \ .y to describe our n 'ral action~ ruthfully. This, afte a ll, is
wh a --thics in a normative •nse is
all aoout: it is an attempt o find
out the moral meaning or human
significance of our deeds. And this
is a meaning that we do not give to
our actions, but it is one that they
have, whether we want them to
have it or not, and that we ought to
be able to discover. We discover
that meaning by raising questions
(who, what, whe re, when, how, why,
with what results, a re any alternatives available). In showing the relevance of these questions in determining the meaning of o ur actions
Maquire is perhaps at his best, a lthough one of my objections to the
position that he ultimately deve lo ps
is that I do not believe that he takes
seriously enough some of the answers that may be given to these
questions. There are, furthermore,
o ther questions tha t can be raised.
For insta nce, what moral identity
is a person tak iQg o n himself in
doing ~his deed? We shall return to
this s ubsequently.
In describing ethics as an activity
carried on by intelligent men that
consists in the raising of relevant
questions Maquire is right on target.
That is why ethics consists in large
measure in listening, in listening to
reality and to people, above all
people who do some th inking, people like Maquire. In this section of
his book Maquire also comments on
the role of principles, feelings (what
he calls Gemiit), group experience,
ra tio nal analysis, and c reative imagination in e thics. His observations
he re are very much worth noting,
in pa rticular his reflections on the
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role of creative imagination ir· devising viable a lternatives to the
terrible dilemmas that confror us
in our struggle to make sens of
our lives. Nonetheless, his di· ussion of principles in ethics is · i1 my
judgment very inade-q uate, f
he
makes no distinction whatsc ver
between a moral -principle a I a
moral rule . This is a matter of on·
siderable importance, but sin ~ it
is not of immediate concern t1 the
argument that he advances th t e is
no urgency to comment on this
here. Still it is a matter of con ~rn ,
particularly for a brother ett .:ist.
After discussing in general that
it means to do ethics Maquir ad·
dresses fo ur questio_n s of sr c ial
relevance in any attempt to g t to
the true meaning of activitie~ that
may terminate life in a medica! .::on·
text. These deal with the diffe• ·nee
between o mission and commi ion,
the directly and indirectly inte1 Jed.
the use of ordinary and of t '< tra·
o rdinary means, a nd the meant tg of
proportionidity. These questior s are
of urge ncy for various rea.;ons.
Some writers (e.g., Joseph Fletc her)
say that it ma kes no moral dtffe r·
e nce whatsoeve r whether 'one kills a
person directly by an act of com·
mission o r " kills" him indirectly
by an act of o mission (by refusing
to use some m edical device that
could prolo ng life - o r prolong the
dying process? - or by ceasing to
use it once it has been begun).
Maquire argues, and rightly so. that
the distinctions between omitting
a n action a nd committing an action,
between killing a person direcdy
a nd allowing him to die his own
death and thus " killing" him in-
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directly by refusing to use extraordinary means are valid and of
critical moral importance. They are
valid because they refer to diffe ring
moral realities; there are differi ng
truth-making factors involved. So
far, so good.
The trouble begins, I think, when
Maguire starts to analyze more
closely the diffe rence between the
"indirectly" and the "directly"
intended and the role tha t the principle of proportionate reason plays
in giving us clues to the true significance or mea ning of our mora l
deeds. Maguire, wh ile recognizing
the· validity of the distinction between the direc tly a nd the indirectly intended, becomes worried about
its applicability and begins to place
too much stress on the role of the
proportionate good. There are
many reasons why this can happen,
and some are spelled o ut in his
text. For one thing, Catholic moralists in the past went thro ugh considerable mental gymnastics over
the directly and the indirectly intended (that is, doing deeds that
directly accomplish good while indirectly accomplishing evil), and
Maguire does a maste rful job of
showing what these gymnastics were
and the absurdities to which they
led: justifying some ho rribly unjustifiable deeds·carried out in the
Dame of the "just war," a nd damning some deeds that really are justifiable, such as aborting a fetus
Yihen this is the only available al·
ternative for saving the life of the
Dlotber, while offering ina ne advice
about baptizing twoheaded fetuses.
For another, there is discernible in
contemporary Cath o lic moral
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thought a , ust, crystallized in the
position c'
lo ped by the man who
is perhar
he o utstanding moral
theologia tn this country, Richard
McCorm; t., to believe that one
can rightl; hoth directly intend and
effect evil provided there is a value
or good of s uch importa nce that
its realization can justify the doing
of the deadly deed a nd even directly intending it in itself but not fo r
itse lf (as McCorm ick puts it: directly intending and effecting evil in se
sed non propter se). In other words ,
the argument, as Maguire advances
it, is that a sufficient proportionate
good (for instance, hu man dignity
and freedom) can serve to justify
th e doing of th e deadly deed under
cer tain circ umstances.
T hat this in fact is what Maguire
himself believes is amply demonstrated in a ch apter where he applies this way of thinking to such
topics as abortion (justifiable, as
as act directly terminative of the
life of the fetus and inte nded as
such, under certain kinds of conditions, largely dependent on the
age of the fetus), capital punishment
(not justifiable, because a sufficient
proportionate good is not at stake
a nd other alternatives are avail- ·
able), war (yes, to an extent, although there are inherent limitations because of the possible disproportionate use of force), and
suicide (yes, under certain kinds of
specifiable con ditions), and , of
· course, death by choice in medical
situations.
My proble m basically is that I
think Maguire's approach opens the
way to certain kinds of killing that
a re not truthfully justifiable, and it
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oper the way toward tJ -;e bec au<; t puts too much W t ht on
the
nciple of pro po rtion, ty. In
ma n' of the cases tha t he d t t r ibes
it is, I believe, mo rally rr ht to
take actions that a re, as p 11vsical
activities, "directly" destructive of
life, but in these instances, I wo uld
argue, the moral activity in q uestion is not pro perly, that is truthfully, describable as a n act of killing.
They are not acts o f killing because
there is not only a proportionate
re ason for engaging in them (the
protection of a truly hu man good
that is imperilled, such as freedom
and dignity) but also in them the
intent of the agent and the thrust o r
directionality o f his action is no t
necessarily against the life of a human being, eve n tho ugh it is foreseen that some o ne is going to die
as a result of the act in question.
They are actions, in o the r words,
in v..:-_ich the doer will not take on
as part of h is mo ral identity the
identity of a killer because they
are nol truthfully acts of killing.
This is the re ason why I believe
that it is pertine nt to ask, what is
the mo ral identity th at a person is
taking on, a nd ta king on unavo idably, in and through his deeds. If
. someone does something that results in death and, in doing this,
does not necessarily take on the
identity of a killer, o ne of the
reasons why this is so is that the
ac t in question is no t pro perly, that
is truthfully or mo rally, an act of
killing.
I can clarify what I mean by
taking some examples that Maguire
uses. Those Eskimos who used to
go. off on an ice floe to die so that
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they wo uld no lo nge r burdel" he
community were · not com m i ng
suicide, althoug h this is th e 1ay
that Mag uire would describe e ir
deed. I submit that they wen tot
setting o ut to e nd their live to·
c hoose death. They realfze t of'
course, that they were going t< lie.
But they were not intending t do
this directly. Nor was thei • act
directly terminative of the ir ·es.
It was directed toward somt ing
e lse - name ly the ir removal om
the community and its res< ces
in food and shelter and so
•th,
and the well being of the
tire
community. They sacrificed 1eir
an
lives for the good of o thers
act that indeed involved 'teir
death but was itself not th ,ted
upon their death. Fo r an imJ •tial
observer to jump upon then and
cry "stop killing yourselves" m id
be as ludicrous as it would b<" o r a
witness to a surgical operat1 1 to
rush into the operating roor and
cry "sto p r:nutiiating that p son,
docto r." Similarly some a ions
that a perso n may take to stc ) the
insufferable pain that a dyin per·
son may be e xperienc ing (Ra · sey's
second qualification , be it oted,
in his sensitively written a t lysis
of our duty to care a nd (or yl to
care fo r the d ying) may be do ectly
causative of d eath in the ph\sical
se nse but n ot be directly ca Jsitive
in a mora l sense. Their doers are
no t taking o n the identity of killers,
and they are not doing so precisely
because the d e ed they do is not to
be described truthfully as an act of
killing.
What is the importance of this?
It is this. Many of the deeds that
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Maguire justifies in his discussio n
are, in my judg me nt, tru thfully to
be described as acts of ki lling , because in them the doer canno t not
intend the death o f anothe r huma n
being (e.g. , certain kinds of abortion that Maguire justifies, and certain kinds of sui cide) . F o r him
these are justifiable o nly in terms
of a propo rtio nate good. a princ iple that he te rms the "master rubric
in ethics." F or m e, the princ iple
of propo rtio nality is a necessary but
not sufficient c riterion; it need s to
be comple m ented by the princ iple
of the directly vs. th e indirectly
intended, in the sense that both
the intent of the age nt and the intent or thrust of the action is d irectly targeted o n a good and o nly
indirectly o n an evil - and this
principle , inturn, must be com plemented by the principle of proportionality.
Maguire, I be lieve, may have let
his rheto ric carry him away. He
frequently speaks o f dea th as a
friend. Death, I s ubmit , is not a
friend. To call death a frie nd is to
use a perso nificatio n, a n anthropomorphism. Death, as a reality, is an
evil. It is no t the greatest evil , to
be sure, but it is still a n evil, fo r it is
the deprivatio n o f a real good, the
good of life, and the o nly life that
we know of immediately a nd directly. Life too is a real good, and must
be recognized and respected as
such, even thoug h it is no t the absolute o r greatest good , the summum bonum (an e rror that those
rnake who would insist that we keep
~n doi~g everything to preserve
ife unttl the matter is completely
beyond our control). What is a
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friend is e person who will d o a
deed th, m ay indeed bring on
death (a
· ve n directly, in a physical sensl hu t will at the same time
respect tl;c life and dignity of a h uman bemg .
Some reade rs may suspect th a t
my objections to M aguire's position (since it is o ne with whic h I
am. in many ways, in substantial
agree me nt) a re me rely matters o f
semantics a nd quibbling. So me m ay
thin k tha t I a m e ngaging in the m e ntal gym nastics tha t typified som e
of the manualists of a bygone day.
Yet there is, I submit, something
of crucial signific ance at stake . T o
me Maguire's positio n opens the
way to killings that really are killings, to deed s the doing of whic h
would inevitably mean that the ir
doer were taking o n , as part of his
moral identity, the identity o f a
killer. I've tried to show why in
as sho rt a s pace as possible. For
readers seri o usly inte rested in the
questio n I would suggest that they
read carefully two of Maguire's
favorite authors: Tho mas Aquinas
and J. G le nn Gray. T he article in
Summa Theologiae 11-11 , 64, 7, o n
ki lling in self-defense and th e difference Gray sees in those comba t
soldiers wh o became kille rs a nd
those who did not, altho ugh bo th
engaged in acts that killed people,
may help illumine my problem with
Maguire. I a lso suggest that they
read an a utho r who is obviously no t
o ne of Mag uire's favorites, since
he is nowhere cited in the work, althoug h he has written, and sensitively so, o n the critical issues a t
stake, Germ a in Grisez, particularly
his study o f abortion .
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Da iel Maguire has gi\ n us a
very .:nsitive and thoughtf, 1 book.
He , ~ al izes that good ett. ·s depen<.. on good argument!>. I believe that be has given us, n this
study, many excellent argu mt> nts (I
have not even noted some of his
wonderful ideas about handling the
issue of who should decide in issues
of life and death). Nonetheless, I

think that in many ways he
failed to think deeply enough <
the issue, and particularly the
vance of the distinction bet
the indirectly and the direct!
tended for the problem at the
of his book.
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The Mendel Club of Boston College and the Guild of
St. Luke of Boston presented a lecture April 26 to
observe the establishment of a library on medical
ethics at Boston College. The speaker was William J .
Harrington . M .D., a Boston College alumnus. former
member of the Boston guild and chairman of the Department of Medicine at Miami University School of
Medicine. His topic was "Human Experimentation."
Financed by the guild and housed at Boston College,
the new library will serve as an important resource
function for those interested in the burgeoning fiel d
of medical ethics.
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Death by Choice: A Rejoinder

William E. May
Professor of C hristian Et ~
Catholic University of An ·ica

ANNOUNCEMENT
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Daniel C. Maguire

What is most -noteworthy in W illiam E . May's reaction to my book
is his agreement with me. The main
burden of my book is to argue that
we have overestimated our moral
dominion over death in certain
cases such as war and capital punishment and underestimated it in
matters commonly referred to as
mercy killing or euthanasia. May
says that be is "in many ways, in
substantial agreement," and that
is true. For example, May allows
that in certain cases where a dying
person has insufferable pain, physically direct action to terminate life
may be moral. The perso n who
brings on death "even directly, in
a physical sense" may be a friend.
Do not miss what is being said
here. Physically direct action may
mean such things as bubbles of air ,
injections of potassium chloride , or
morphine, etc. May, while not enumerating the possible means supP<>rts the position that life may be
terminated not just by omission of
extraordinary means, but by commission and direct action. T his im-
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pressive fact should not be lost in
the methodological and semantic
debate of May's critique, because
it is illustrative of where the argument is today. I predict that it will
become increasingly c lear that
Catholic and other moralists will
continue to shift from an absolute
negative on death by choice in a,
medical context. This shift from
taboo t o nuance is not without danger. The collapse of taboo is always
perilous. But the simplism of taboo
is not ethics, and it is o nly ethics,
which makes distinctions where are
differences, that is worthy of the
human spirit. We have no c hoic~
but to pay the high price of moral
freedom and assume the ethical
task of determining when we have
the moral right to induce death and
when we do not.
May offers criticism of my use of
the traditional category "direct/ indirect." In the language of o ne of
the older manuals of moral theology, the direct/ indirect distinction
is explained like this:
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